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THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE-SHOULD IT BE INTER-
PRETED TO PROTECT THE INSUREDS OF A
GROUP INSURANCE POLICY?
INTRODUCTION
The incontestability clause, since its first appearance in an 1864 insur-
ance contract,' has achieved a widespread acceptability in modern-day
health and life insurance policies. The clause is unique in that it bars the
insurance company from contesting the validity of its policy after a specified
period, usually one or two years after the policy's date of issue. Insurers
developed the clause so that individual policyholder-insureds and their bene-
ficiaries could recover on policies without litigation. Insureds wanted to use
insurance with confidence in their financial planning. Insurance companies,
recognizing this fact and wanting to maintain sales, invented the clause to
stabilize the validity of their long-term contract coverage.
2
State insurance laws commonly require some form of the clause to be
included in both individual and group life insurance contracts.3  A simple
but typical clause provides that "[t]his policy shall be incontestable after
one year from the date of issue except for non-payment of premiums."14
The clause has generally served its purpose well in individual policies. 5 It
has 'been applied with much confusion in group policies, however, where the
insured is not a party to the contract. The above clause, for instance, when
narrowly construed applies only to the policyholder-usually the employer
or multiple-employer association that holds the master policy. It does not
protect the insured employee covered only as a third party beneficiary
through a certificate. 6
1. Read, The Evolving Incontestability Clause in Group Life Policies, 14 ASS'N
OF LIFE INS. COUNCIL PRoc. 797 (1959).
2. Powell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 313 Ill. 161, 164-65, 144 N.E. 825, 826
(1924); Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 264, 247 N.E.2d
655, 657 (1969).
3. See generally Shield, A New Look at the Incontestability Clause, 11 Ass'N.
OF LIFE INS. COUNCIL PRoc. 23 (1952).
4. Fischer v. United States Life Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 879, 881 (4th Cir. 1957).
5. In a common example, the incontestability clause bars an insurance company
from contesting the validity of an individual policy procured by an insured who mis-
represented on his application that he met the policy's health requirement. The clause,
if tolled, forces the insurance company to pay off a valid claim against the policy,
whereas absent the clause the insurer could have voided the contract as procured by
fraud. See also Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 56
Ill. 2d 41, 46-47, 305 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Washington National Ins. Co. v. Burch, 270 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1959).
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Such construction allows insurers to deny the existence of coverage and
refuse payment on claims brought by insureds or their beneficiaries after the
tolling of an incontestability clause. This situation circumvents the clause's
purpose, however, of assuring insureds and their 'beneficiaries of litigation-
free recovery on policies on which premiums have been paid for years.
Illinois recently became the latest state to interpret the incontestability
clause in a group policy, holding in Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States7 that an insurance company could contest the
existence of an insured's coverage in defense to a beneficiary's claim brought
after the running of a two-year clause. This article will critically analyze
the history of the incontestability clause as interpreted to protect only the
policyholder and not the insureds of group policies. It will then analyze
the Illinois case as the latest extension of this concept, and conclude by dis-
cussing the emerging trend of reasoning on this subject.
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE CLAUSE'S APPLICATION
IN GROUP POLICIES
In interpreting group policy incontestability clauses, the courts have of-
ten been called upon to answer the question of whether the clause bars an
insurance company from defending against a claim on the ground that the
insured was not an employee eligible for coverage under the policy.8 A
New Hampshire court in 1966, prefacing its decision in such a case, noted
that "[ilt is difficult to explore even a small area of this subject without
becoming lost in a maze of conflicting decisions and subtle distinctions." 9
Nevertheless, at least four major arguments have been advanced for deciding
that the clause should not protect insured employees.
A. The Conway Distinction
Much confusion has developed because of the courts' insistence on ex-
plaining their decisions in terms of limitations set on the clause's application
in the famous case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Conway.'0
Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court, approved the addition to an indi-
vidual policy of a rider stating that certain aviation hazards were risks not
assumed by the policy. He said that statutory incontestability restrictions
were inapplicable to the rider provision:
The provision that a policy shall 'be incontestable after it 'has been
7. 56 111. 2d 41, 305 N.E.2d 144 (1973).
8. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 632 (1969) for a collection of cases dealing with
this issue. The incontestability clause has been held not to protect insureds in the ma-
jority of group policy cases.
9. Fischer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 107 N.H. 101, 103, 218 A.2d 62,
64 (1966).
10. 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930).
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in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years
is not a mandate as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to
:be born by the insurer. It means only ,this, that within the limits
of the coverage, the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense
that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid
by reason of a condition broken. (Emphasis added.)"
A frequently cited group insurance case, Fischer v. United States Life In-
surance Company,' 2 applied the Conway rationale in holding that the incon-
testability clause was no bar to an ineligibility defense. The Fischer court
explained that the clause "[w]as never intended to enlarge the coverage of
the policy, to compel the insurance company to insure lives it never intended
to cover or to accept risks or hazards clearly excluded by the terms of the
policy."' 3 This article contends that the import of the Conway case has
been too broadly interpreted and thus misapplied, as in Fischer, to group
policy situations.
The rider in Conway did not provide that persons who rode in aircraft
were ineligible for insurance. If it had, the court would have arguably ap-
plied the policy's incontestability clause to the rider in the same way such
clauses are commonly applied to bar health eligibility challenges. 14 Rather,
the rider provided only that the insurer refused to be obligated to pay on
the policy as a result of the insured's death in an air mishap. Conway
stands for the proposition that an insurer can limit the types of deaths or
disabilities for which it will or will not pay on a policy. The case did not
decide an eligibility issue.' 5
Analogously, a group insurer may provide that it will not assume the
risk of its insureds' deaths by an air crash or other causes. Incontestability
restrictions could not apply to such provisions that define only the risk the
policy assumes, as opposed to defining the persons it covers. On the other
hand, incontestability clauses should prevent group insurers from challenging
eligibility misrepresentations. The clause was designed to stabilize the val-
idity of coverage after giving insurance companies time to investigate and
discover misrepresentations by insureds for which it could void coverage.
B. The Never-Covered Argument
A second argument cited to justify permitting an insurance company
to contest an insured's eligibility for group coverage despite incontestability
restrictions is that an ineligible insured is never covered by the policy nor
thereafter affected by the incontestability clause within it.' 6 The fallacy of
11. Id. at 452, 169 N.E. at 642.
12. 249 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1957).
13. Id. at 882.
14. See note 5 supra.
15. 252 N.Y. 449, 453, 169 N.E. 642, 643 (1930).
16. See Carp v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.
1958); Spitz v. Continental Casualty Co., 40 Wis. 2d 439, 162 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
this contention is that the same never-covered situation exists with individual
insurance policies where the clause does protect insureds.
For instance, an insured who contends he does not have a terminal
disease, when in fact he does, is likewise ineligible to be covered by the
individual policy requiring good health. Yet, an insurer who issues him such
a policy based on the insured's misrepresentation Will be barred by a tolled
incontestability clause -from later challenging the coverage. 17 The insurer,
in effect, is forced to insure the life of an unhealthy person that it never
intended to cover. Opposite to what Fischer contended, 18 the clause does
not enlarge the coverage of the policy. Rather it validates coverage that the
insurer did not intend or write the policy to provide.
The employment requirement' 9 in a group policy is, in effect, that pol-
icy's health requirement. The insurer, while not requiring the individuals
to meet health standards, does require the group to meet an average health
expectation by being bound together for a pre-existing interest other than
to secure low cost insurance, i.e., as employees for a company. 20  The incon-
testability clause should be applied to force the insurer to verify the group's
health standard by determining that its members meet the employment re-
quirement, in the same manner it forces an individual insurer to verify the
good health of its insured. Only in this way can the clause serve its purpose
of stabilizing coverage and protecting insureds and dependents from costly
litigation to recover on policies for which premiums have long been paid.
C. The Master Policy Argument
The typical incontestability clause that refers to a "policy" is often nar-
rowly interpreted to apply only to the master policy and protect only the
employer or association that holds that policy.2 ' This construction should
be discouraged for two reasons. First, the narrow application negates the
clause's original function of protecting insureds and their beneficiaries from
claim litigation. 22  Second, such interpretation renders the clause virtually
useless, as it has no meaningful application in connection with protecting
employer or multiple-employer association policyholders. As one writer ex-
plained:
A simple incontestability clause . . . would have very limited
17. See note 5 supra.
18. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
19. Most group policies, in addition to requiring that a prospective insured be
employed, require him or her to also be employed full-time or for so many hours per
week, or to be actively at work, to be eligible for coverage. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d
632 (1969).
20. Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of the Group Technique, in GROuP IN-
SUfRANCE HANDBOOK 40-41 (Eilers and Crowe ed. 1965).
21. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
22. See text following note 6 supra.
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scope in view of the minimal content of the usual application made
by the proposed group policyholder. Few, if any, representations
are made therein. Conceivable grounds for con-test would be the
nature of the group policyholder's business, or the lack of de jure
existence of the partnership or corporation shown as a group pol-
icyholder. Another possible ground would be that there was not
the minimum number of covered lives required by the applicable
group insurance statute . . . . No reported case was found where
any of these defenses were raised by the insurer or where an
insurer attempted to rescind a group policy. (Emphasis added.)23
The reference to "'policy" in group clauses should be read to apply to
certificates, and the employees these certificates extend coverage to as a
group policy only takes effect through the certificates.2 4  The "policy" word-
ing of group clauses has been carried over from the individual policy clause
that applies to a "policy" that effects coverage itself, without certificates; in
applying to the policyholder, the individual clause also protects the insured.
The best reasoning would recognize the "policy" wording of the group clause
as historical accident, and apply the clause in group or individual policies
to protect insureds and their beneficiaries. 25
D. The Group Concept Destruction Argument
A final argument made in contention that the incontestability clause
should not bar the contest of a group insured's eligibility is that an investiga-
tion requirement would destroy the advantages of group over individual in-
surance. However, such a requirement would not significantly effect the
unique elements of group insurance, nor add excessively to its overall ad-
ministrative cost.
The greatest advantage of group over individual insurance from a profit
standpoint is that the former is sold on a 'mass scale. A policy covering
a large number of lives does not entail the selling expenses inherent in the
sale of the same number of individual policies.2 6 An enormous savings oc-
curs because the insurer need only contact the group policyholder and sell
a policy to him, rather than contact each insured for a separate sale.
The investigation requirement for the most part would not effect this
initial selling action, nor reduce its savings. 27  Any investigation of individ-
23. W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANcE LAW § 8.23, at 263-64 (2d ed.
1972).
24. "The contest with the beneficiary of a certificate holder, consisting of an at-
tack against the status of such holder as a qualified insured, is in effect a contest di-
rected to the validity of the insurance which is represented by such certificate and for
which premiums were paid and accepted." Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
30 App. Div. 2d 265, 268, 291 N.Y.S.2d 532, 536 (1968).
25. See generally Meyer, supra note 23, § 8:22, at 261.
26. Rall and Sfikas, Group Insurance-Is the Incontestability Clause a Bootstrap
Which Enlarges Coverage, 5 THE FORUM 51, 56 (1969).
27. The insurer, during the selling stage, normally only investigates to determine
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ual eligibility comes when or after the master policy is executed. Such in-
spection is after the employer or association has bought the policy and, in
turn, promoted it to the company's or companies' present employees.
A second advantage of group insurance, that would purportedly be de-
stroyed by an investigation requirement, is the minimization of the under-
writing expense through the lack of necessity to examine each individual in-
sured for his individual risk. The homogeneity of the group furnishes its
own cross-section of risk, making medical examinations unnecessary. It is
argued that employment eligibility should not require verification for similar
savings reasons.
28
The fallacy of this contention is its assumption that such investigation
would be as costly as thorough medical examinations. As stated in Simpson
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company,29 a leading case:
Eligible employment can be determined .by investigating member-
ship rolls or employment records. The cost of this investigation
is appreciably less than medical investigation in private policies
and can be undertaken by a nonprofessional staff. The larger the
number of 'persons which comprise the group the more sophisti-
cated will be ,the accounting system needed to keep track of the
group. The better the record-keeping system, ,the easier it will
be for one -to have access to information to determine eligibility.
The fact that some insurers in the past 'have not investigated an
employee's eligibility until death cannot be given any 'weight.
3 0
Other sources of group employment data could include payroll records,
credit 'bureaus, and simple inquiries to employers or bookkeepers. It is
worth noting that most employers have no incentive to make misrepresenta-
tions as to the eligibility of their employees, since they are often paying all
or a portion of their insureds' premiums. 31
It is generally thought that the smaller employer presents the most
acute problem in connection with ineligibles, since "in many cases the sick
son-in-law is carried on the employment rolls as a regular employee draw-
ing full salary."'3 2 One writer suggests that the incontestability clause should
not bar any eligibility challenges because of this threat.3 3  Counterargu-
that the group the company hopes to insure has some pre-existing relationship. A
group interest other than to obtain low cost insurance is necessary to guarantee a
group selection of risk somewhere near the average insurability level. See note 20
supra and accompanying text.
28. See note 26 supra.
29. 24 N.Y.2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655 (1969).
30. Id. at 269, 247 N.E.2d at 659.
31. Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 56 Ill. 2d
41, 52, 305 N.E.2d 144, 151 (1973).
32. Coburn, The Group Incontestability Clause-Simpson v. Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 1969 PROC. LEG. SEc. AM. LIFE CoNv., 67, 80.
33. Id.
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ments, however, are that the employee eligibility in these cases is often
checked anyway,3 4 and that occasional injustices in smaller cases should not
deny the great number of insureds and beneficiaries under large policies the
clause's intended protection.
Eligibility violations are easier to discover and less costly -when not dis-
covered in large group policies. As the last-quoted writer continued:
In the larger employer case the sick son-in-law is rarely carried
on the employment records and even if he were the case would
have little if any mortality pooling for experience purposes so that
the cost of such adverse selection would ultimately be borne by
the employer himself.A
5
The latter part of the quotation rebuts the argument that claims paid to in-
eligible insureds always increase group premium rates by lowering exper-
ience records.3 6 Again, the problem exists primarily in small group policy
situations and such occasions should not deny the clause's protection to in-
sureds and beneficiaries under larger policies.
It has also been argued that requiring an investigation of insureds' eligi-
bility would impair the self-administration advantage of group insurance.
3 7
However, employer or association administrators generally have little incen-
tive to intentionally misrepresent the eligibility of employees.38  Insurers
could generally depend on the employee information such administrators ob-
tain, and could employ mass -investigative methods when necessary to obtain
verifications.
Finally, insurers argue that the turnover of employees in and out of
a policy's coverage would require a constant check of eligibility records.
39
This is only partially true. A company could take advantage of incontest-
ability periods and uncover all ineligible employees by conducting one mass
investigation within each succeeding incontestability period. Thus, under a
two-year clause a company could check the eligibility of all employees every
eighteen months to discover ineligibles in time to void their coverage.
Such an investigation would discover employees ineligible because of
either enrollment misrepresentations or later terminations of employment not
34. Cody, Underwriting Group Medical Expense Coverage, in GROUP INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 302 (Eilers and Crowe ed. 1965); First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co.
v. United States Life Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir. 1969).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 293 Mich.
482, 487, 292 N.W. 377, 380 (1940).
37. See note 26 supra; General American Life Ins. Co. v. Charleville, 471, S.W.2d
231, 236 (Mo. 1971).
38. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
39. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. v. United States Life Ins. Co., 421
F.2d 959, 963 (3rd Cir. 1969).
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reported. The Simpson case indicates that such a mass investigative system
could be relatively inexpensive to develop and operate. 40
Such scheduled investigations would also aid insurers by reducing the
number of claims they have to individually investigate or litigate at great
expense. This system would have made unnecessary the Illinois case that
recently interpreted the group policy incontestability clause.
THE ILLINOIS DECISION
A. The Facts and Court Opinions
The Illinois case, Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States,41 involved a situation in which a multiple-employer associa-
tion held the master policy of a group life insurance contract. The policy
contained a provision restricting its coverage to employees who worked
thirty-two or more hours per week. 42 The case arose after the insurer issued
a certificate for coverage to an ineligible employee, but four years later re-
fused to honor the claim of the then deceased employee's 'beneficiary.
The beneficiary, Harvey Crawford, was president of a heating company
that was a member of the association. In 1965, he submitted an enrollment
form to the association seeking coverage for his wife, the insured in question,
plus himself and another employee. He misrepresented on the form that
his wife worked the number of hours required for eligibility. She made the
same misrepresentation in a separate application. The insurer issued her
a certificate without investigating the veracity of either of the statements, or
of similar statements that accompanied monthly premium- payments made
on her behalf. The coverage continued until Mrs. Crawford's death in
1969. 43
Crawford submitted a claim to the association after his wife's death,
seeking to recover $10,000 as her beneficiary. He also submitted a death
certificate listing her occupation as that of housewife, causing the association
to advise the insurer to check Mrs. Crawford's eligibility for coverage. The
insurance company refused to pay on the husband's claim after discovering
his wife's ineligibility through a single call to the heating company's book-
keeper. 44 Crawford sued the insurer on the claim, contending that the pol-
icy's two-year incontestability clause barred the insurer from using his wife's
ineligibility for coverage as a defense to his claim as beneficiary.
The majority opinion held that the incontestability clause did not bar
the insurer from contesting Crawford's claim on the ground that Mrs. Craw-
40. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
41. 56 I1. 2d 41, 305 N.E.2d 144 (1973).




ford was never eligible for insurance under the policy. The court began
by holding that only the first part of -the -master policy's two-part incontest-
ability clause was applicable to the case. That part stated "[tihe validity
of this policy shall not be contested, except for the non-payment of prem-
iums, after it has been in force for two years from the date of issue."' 45  The
court noted that the clause incorporated portions of section 231 of the Illi-
nois Insurance Code, continuing:
Subsection (a) of section 231 requires inclusion [in group life pol-
icies issued or delivered in Illinois] of 'A provision that the policy
shall be incontestable after two years from its date of issue during
the lifetime of the insured, except for nonpayment of premiums
and except for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to
military or naval services in time of war.' 46
The opinion went on to discuss both the historical purpose of the incon-
testability clause 47 and the Conway distinction, 48 but then appeared to make
its decision on -the basis of the clause's reference to "this policy." The court
interpreted the clause as barring insurer challenges against only the master
policy's validity. It found no application of the clause to insureds, such as
Mrs. Crawford, extended coverage through certificates.
A challenge to eligibility does not, however, involve an attack
by the insurer on ,the validity of the master policy. The defendant
is not seeking to set aside the policy because of the misrepresen-
tations made and the only aspect of the insurance plan which is
affected is the payment sought by a single beneficiary ....
The incontestability clause of the policy . . . provides only
that the validity of the policy may not be contested, and as we
have seen, its validity is not disputed.49
The court, in dicta, made additional arguments in support of its deci-
45. Id. at 44, 305 N.E.2d at 147.
46. Id. at 45, 305 N.E.2d at 147.
47. Id. at 46-47, 305 N.E.2d at 147-48.
48. "While the broad distinction drawn in Conway between a policy's limits
of coverage and its validity has been quite generally recognized, differences
of opinion have arisen as to its application, particularly with respect to group
life insurance . . . .With individual life insurance the policy identifies a spe-
cific individual by name, and it is relatively easy to distinguish between a
question of coverage (the death of an insured or his death from some specific
cause) and a question of validity created by antecedent misrepresentations on
the part of the insured. In the case of group life insurance, however, the mas-
ter policy undertakes to provide insurance for a collection of unnamed persons
defined only in terms of membership in a class, such as the employees of a
certain company. To ascertain whether a person is insured necessitates a de-
termination of whether he is in fact a member of the class. To the extent
that that determination is based upon information furnished by the employer
or by an employee or alleged employee, the question whether coverage exists
tends to become intertwined with the question whether the coverage was ob-
tained by false representation."
Id. at 48-49, 305 N.E.2d at 149.
49. Id. at 51-52, 305 N.E.2d at 150.
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sion. It noted that forcing insurers to pay claims on the death of persons
not meeting eligibility standards would increase premium rates for other as-
sociation employers by altering the experience rating.50
The court argued further that Crawford's case was analogous to a ter-
mination of employment situation, citing the Illinois Appellate case Baker
v. Prudential Insurance Company of America,5 1 which held that an insurer
was not liable on a group life policy for the death of a former employee
who was discharged shortly prior to his death. The Crawford court
adopted the Baker argument that the incontestability clause could only pre-
vent an insurer "from contending that the policy was obtained by fraud or
misrepresentation or upon any other ground, going to the original validity
of the policy."
'52
Lastly, the court argued that an investigation requirement for insurers
would cause "substantial expense and the unnecessary duplication of rec-
ords" 5 3 and would "undermine group life insurance which is customarily con-
ducted on a 'self-administrative' fashion with the employer or employer group
maintaining the record of individual employees, thus reducing the cost of
premiums."
'54
The dissent in Crawford relied on the application to this case of the
second part of the incontestability clause:
[A]nd no statement made by any employee insured under this
policy relating to his insurability shall be used in contesting the
validity of the insurance with respect to which such statement was
made, after such insurance has been in force prior to the contest
for a period of two years during such employee's lifetime nor un-
less it is contained in a written application signed by such em-
ployee and a copy of such application is or has been furnished
to such employee or his beneficiary.55
50. Id. at 52, 305 N.E.2d at 150-51.
51. 279 Ill. App. 5 (1938).
52. Quoting Baker v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 279 Ill. App. 5, 10
(1938).
53. Id. at 53, 305 N.E.2d at 151.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 54, 305 N.E.2d at 152. This part incorporates portions of subsection
(b) of section 231 of the Illinois Insurance Code requiring group life policies in Illinois
to contain:
[a] provision that the policy, the application of the employer or trustee of
an association of employees and the individual applications, if any, of the
employees insured shall constitute the entire contract between the parties, and
that all statements made by the employer or trustee or by the individual em-
ployees shall, in the absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not war-
ranties, and that no such statement shall be used in defense to a claim un-
der the policy, unless it is contained in a written application.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 843(b) (1971).
Part of the statute provides, in effect, that fraudulent statements will be inter-
preted as warranties-that is, as literally true and in the nature of a condition precedent
to the contract-so that when discovered false they can be cited as a defense to void the
contract. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1465, 1758 (4th ed. rev. 1968). The second
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The opinion stated that the word "insurability" in the clause meant
more than just a condition of the employee's health-as the majority ap-
parently believed. 56 "[I]t means 'capable of being insured' or the 'quality or
condition of being insurable' . . . and the only contention made by [the
insurer of the decedent's] ineligibility or lack of insurability is her failure to
be regularly employed." '5 T The opinion said that a tolled incontestability
clause would bar an insurer's defense that an insured was uninsurable based
on illness, and should similarly bar an uninsurability defense based on
employee ineligibility. 58
The dissent argued that the clause gave insurers ample time to investi-
gate for misrepresentations, and that policies provided for, and insurers
made, "periodic inspections and audits."'59 It concluded that an incontest-
ability clause would govern in a termination of employment situation where
an insurer failed to learn of the employee's termination and accepted prem-
iums thereafter for the incontestability period.6 0
B. Critique of the Opinion
The dissent correctly applied the second part of the incontestability
clause to this case, giving a broad interpretation to "insurability." The word
and the clause, if limited to a health application, would have no meaning
in group policies, which do not base their coverage on individual health
status. The foremost difference between group and individual insurance is:
[T]he group selection of risks as contrasted to individual selection
of risks. With few exceptions, group insurance is issued without
medical examination or other evidence of individual insura-
bility." 61
part of the Crawford clause, which would assumedly be governed by this statutory
directive, added an incontestability clause provision that forced the insurer to discover
misrepresentations or fraudulent statements by any employee within two years during
such employee's lifetime in order to retain the defense. The insurer in Crawford did
not discover Mrs. Crawford's fraudulent eligibility representation on her application
until four years after she made it. The incontestability clause, which had tolled two
years before during Mrs. Crawford's lifetime, precluded the insurer from citing her
fraudulent statement to void the contract.
56. The majority opinion at page 45, 305 N.E.2d at 147, stated that the parties
"apparently consider[ed]" the second part of the incontestability clause inapplicable to
the case because it was "intended only to deal with cases where proof of individual in-
surability [was] required." The Court apparently agreed, but its conclusion makes no
sense unless "insurability" was limited to a health meaning, since certainly the dece-
dant's individual insurability, in a broad sense, was at issue here.
57. 56 111. 2d 41, 54, 305 N.E.2d 144, 152 (1973).
58. Id. at 55, 305 N.E.2d at 152.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of the Group Technique, in GRouP IN-
SURANCE HANDBOOK 32-33 (Eilers and Crowe ed. 1965); Note, Some Economic and
Legal Aspects of Group Insurance Policies, 36 CQLVM. L. REv. 89, 89 (1936).
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The application of the second part of the clause is further supported
by the fact that, like the first part, the second part incorporates portions
of section 231 of the Illinois Insurance Code.62  Since that Code section sets
out provisions to be used in group life policies, the second part like the first
should be given a meaningful group policy application.
This article contends that a decision for the beneficiary could also have
been made on the basis of the application of the first part of the clause,
had it appeared alone in the policy. The reason is that the statutory para-
graph requiring that clause refers to the "lifetime of the insured." 63  The
statute was designed, despite its "policy" wording, to protect individual in-
sureds. The court should have applied the clause with this understanding.
The dissent advanced an analogy to termination of employment in con-
tending that the incontestability clause should apply if an insurer accepts
premiums for two years after an employer stops working. 4  Insurers could
discover termination violations and Crawford-type misrepresentations
through one low-cost investigation within each successive incontestability
period.6 5 Insurers should have such an investigative duty to prevent in-
sureds and beneficiaries from being denied claims after paying premiums for
several years.
Lastly, the majority contentions that payments to ineligibles would raise
premium rates, and that an investigation duty would undermine group insur-
ance, were examined earlier in this article in connection with the general
history of the incontestability clause. Those discussions proposed counter-
,arguments to both contentions.
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THE EMERGING TREND IN APPLYING THE GROUP
POLICY INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE
The New York case of Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Company67 set precedent in 1969 when it created the "discoverability" test
in applying an incontestability clause in a group life insurance policy. The
insurer in that case issued a certificate to an employee who had misrepre-
sented on his enrollment card that he met the policy's eligibility requirement
62. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 73, § 843 (1971).
63. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. The author of the Crawford policy
omitted the "lifetime of the insured" phrase from the first part of its incontestability
clause, but included it in the second part of the clause that contained additional incon-
testability restrictions not required by section 231 of the Illinois Insurance Code. It
appears that the author intended the second part to apply to individual coverage and
the first part to the master policy. But this writer's point is that the statute requires
incontestability restrictions to be inserted in group life policies to protect individual in-
sureds, and that the first part if alone would have had to have been so construed.
64. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
65. See text following note 39, supra.
66. See text following note 35 supra.
67, 24 N,Y,2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655.
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of working thirty hours per week. The insurer thereafter accepted premium
payments on the employee's behalf without investigating to discover, until
after the two-year clause had tolled, that the employee never met the eligi-
bility standard.
The court held that the tolled incontestability clause barred the insurer
from using the employee's ineligibility as a defense to the beneficiary's claim.
The court said the clause was applicable to risks discoverable within the
incontestability period, and that such a risk was that of insuring an employee
ineligible for coverage: 68
Phoenix -had the opportunity at the time it issued the certificates,
or within two years of this date, to determine whether in 'fact the
insured was a proper member of the group [eligible for insur-
ance]. The insurer, having failed to investigate, cannot be heard
to complain now.69
The Simpson court compared the employment eligibility requirement of
a group policy with the health eligibility requirement of an individual policy.
It noted that the problem of "adverse selection" of unfavorable insurance
risks exists in both cases, and that employment eligibility would be consider-
ably less costly to investigate than is health eligibility in individual policies.
70
The Crawford dissent, following the appellate court below, adopted the
Simpson rationale in contending that Crawford was entitled to his claim as
his deceased-wife's beneficiary. This article contends that the Crawford
court should have followed its dissent rather than apply the clause, as it did,
to protect the association master policy holder and not the beneficiary.
The incontestability clause, as a 1972 Utah case following Simpson
said, simply creates "a period during which time the insurer may by investi-
gation guard against risks it did not intend to assume. '71 As in the health
fraud situation in individual policies, the clause in group policies bars an
insurer from defending on the basis that "the deceased is not the kind of
person that he was described to be."
'72
Such was the situation in Crawford where Mrs. Crawford was misrepre-
sented as being a thirty-two hour per week employee. The insurance com-
pany in Crawford should have been held to the duty of contesting her eli-
gibility for coverage 'before accepting premiums on her behalf beyond the
two-year incontestability period. Only in this way would the clause have
served its purpose of protecting -the insured and her beneficiary. The incon-
testability clause was never intended to condone an insured's fraud, but it
68. id. at 265, 247 N.E.2d at 658.
69. Id. at 269, 247 N.E.2d at 659.
70. Id. at 268-69, 247 N.E.2d at 658-59.
71. Cragun v. Bankers Life Co., 28 Utah 2d 19, 21, 497 P.2d 641, 643 (1972).
72. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220, 224 (9th Cir.
1940).
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was intended to create a period beyond which an insurance company could
not use that fraud to challenge the validity of an insured's coverage. 73 The
clause should be so applied in group insurance policies.
JAMES M. KIRKLAND
73. Morris v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 278, 281, 171 S.E. 740,
742 (1933).
